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Abstract: Andrew Levine analyses the theoretical legacy of recent Marxist schools, focusing in
particular on analytical Marxism (AM). He argues that AM is uniquely suited to provide the
foundations for a revival of Marxist theory. In this paper, Levine’s reconstruction of the core of
Marxism and his analysis of the trajectory of AM are critically discussed. Although the theoretical
contribution of AM should not be overlooked, some objectionable methodological and theoretical
tenets of AM, and in particular of Rational Choice Marxism, are discussed, which help to explain
the demise of the school. Various directions for further research are suggested, which emphasise
the importance of structural constraints and endogenous preferences.
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1A Future for Marxism? is a remarkable book. It raises many issues at the
heart of socialist theory and politics, such as the philosophical foundations of a
socialist project, the role of Marxism for the reconstruction of socialist thought,
and the legacy of the main recent schools of Marxist thought. It analyses deep
philosophical issues with exemplary rigour, clarity, and political passion. 
First, Andrew Levine broaches the main ideologies emerged from the French
Revolution – conservatism, liberalism, and socialism – which have dominated the
theoretical and political stage since. Scientific socialism and Marxism are placed
in this theoretical background, and the defeat of Marxism is seen as coterminous
with the retreat of all the ‘Enlightenment Left’ and with the “loss of faith in
progress or, more precisely, in a better world that differs in kind, not just degree,
from our own” (p.10). Then, Levine provides a critical appraisal of the experience
of the New Left, which is also an interesting biography of a generation of radicals.
This theme runs throughout the book, whose very structure replicates Levine’s
own intellectual trajectory, from structuralist Marxism to analytical Marxism
(hereafter, AM). The analysis of the latter schools of Marxist thought is the core
of the book. Unlike previous approaches, they did not aim “to produce a
proletarian philosophy” (p.58): by the time the New Left emerged, this seemed no
longer plausible in a world “without a proletariat or its functional equivalent”
(p.72). They aimed “to discover the authentic core of Marxist theory, and then
reconstruct Marxism on that basis” (p.58). Their achievements, suggests Levine,
should be the starting point for the revival of socialist theory.
Due to space constraints, it is impossible to discuss all the issues raised in
this dense and stimulating book. This review focuses on AM, for two reasons.
2First, AM raises a number of substantive and methodological issues that are
central in the social sciences. Second, the main aim of the book “is to try to make
sense of what [AM] meant, of what it continues to mean, and of what it could
mean in the years ahead” (p.xii). The core contention is that AM is uniquely
suited to provide the foundations for a revival of Marxism, because analytical
Marxists, “more than their traditional or contemporaneous rivals, ‘discovered’ …
what remains vital in the Marxist tradition” (p.x). This claim rests upon (i) the
reconstruction of a distinctive, rational core of Marxist theory based on AM
contributions; and (ii) an explanation of the demise of AM as a Marxist school,
despite (i). These two arguments are analysed in turn.
THE CORE OF MARXIST THEORY
Levine identifies three core components of Marxist theory. The first, and
foremost, is Marx’s theory of history, or historical materialism (HM), which
detects “an endogenous process that supplies history with a determinate trajectory
from one mode of production or economic structure to another” (p.33). The
fundamental contribution of AM, emerging from Cohen’s (1978) seminal book,
and the subsequent debate, according to Levine, is the reconstruction of a rigorous
version of HM, articulated into two main theses. The first states that the level of
development of productive forces functionally explains the nature of the economic
structure. The second states that “economic structures … [functionally] explain
legal and political superstructures and also ways of thinking or forms of
consciousness” (p.151). Levine interprets HM as “a theory of historical
possibilities opened up by the development of ‘productive forces’” (p.164), with
an important role for class struggle. HM is an account of a possible communist
3future, which can “unify what would otherwise be a motley of well-meaning, but
mainly reactive, causes into a movement with a serious prospect of changing life
for the better” (p.171). HM is thus “the foundational theory of scientific socialism,
… the core upon which any future Marxism must build” (p.34). 
The second component is Marx’s theory of the state. In Marxist theory,
states are class dictatorships expressing the rule of the economically dominant
class; to each economic structure, there corresponds a different form of state. The
proletarian state is the only state whose historical aim is to eliminate the need for
states. The socialist revolution should establish “institutions that are progressively
self-effacing” (p.162). This notion is incompatible with “the statism endemic to
all strains of modern political philosophy, including liberalism” (p.163).
Third, Levine identifies “self-realization, autonomy and community – and,
more ambivalently, equality” (p.170) – as normative values typical of Marxism.
They do not amount to a distinctive ideology, because “the normative
commitments of socialists are hardly different from those of the majority of
nonsocialists” (p.27), but “there may be a distinctive Marxist way of putting these
valuational commitments together” (p.170). 
Levine’s analysis is careful, rigorous and, on the whole, persuasive. Two
questions immediately arise, though: are these the only defensible parts of Marx’s
theory? Do they define a framework that can promote a progressive research
program in explanatory social science? These questions are crucial to understand
whether the reconstruction of the core can provide the foundations for a revival of
Marxist theory, or instead it is bound to remain a brilliant but sterile logical
4exercise. Levine’s answer to them is strictly linked to his account of the demise of
AM as a Marxist school. This is the least convincing part of his argument.
Levine oscillates between two explanations. Neither of them is entirely
compelling and – as presented – they seem prima facie contradictory. On the one
hand, he notes that “ideas of political consequence are always historically situated
and conditioned by their context” (p.viii). Indeed, he provides a thorough analysis
of the political, intellectual, and social climate of the Anglo-Saxon world in the
1960s-70s, and of its influence on AM’s birth and initial development. There is no
equally satisfactory analysis of the context in which AM waned, and of its
influence on AM theorising. Levine claims that the facts on the ground – most
notably, the absence of a revolutionary agent – “eventually helped to quash even
these new ventures in Marxist philosophy” (p.73), but this is little more than a
suggestion. There are also some scattered remarks concerning the dynamics
spurned by the academicisation of Marxism and the déformations professionnelles
induced by “the professional culture and disciplinary styles to which analytical
Marxists held themselves accountable” (p.141), which, according to Levine, have
influenced them “despite their own findings” (p.166). These issues may have been
relevant, but per se they beg more fundamental questions.
On the other hand, Levine argues that “it was philosophy, more than
anything else, that did Marxism in” (p.vii). AM contributed to the demise of
Marxism as a distinct intellectual tendency “not just in acquiescence to the spirit
of the age, but for reasons grounded in arguments” (p.122). Yet he does not
explain the philosophical arguments that have led many analytical Marxists to
conclude “that there is nothing distinctive to ‘Marxism’ at all” (p.vii). No
5reference is provided to AM work in which the core elements of his account are
challenged. Actually, according to Levine, the explanatory pretensions of HM
have been deflated, but the theory is essentially sound and “no analytical Marxist
ever provided good reasons to think that a political theory consonant with
historical materialist positions … would somehow be untenable” (p.147). 
Levine does briefly discuss some AM work in the social sciences. He argues
that “[t]hanks to the work of John Roemer and others, Marxist political economy
… collapsed into [neoclassical economics, and] Marxist sociology suffered a
similar fate” (p.136). The specific issues raised by Levine, however, only concern
a specific approach within AM, and thus cannot explain the trajectory of AM as a
whole. This distinction has not a mere definitional, or historical, interest. Given
the theoretical and methodological heterogeneity of analytical Marxists, it is
crucial to evaluate AM’s legacy and its role for the future of Marxism. The lack of
a rigorous definition of AM and of a proper distinction between alternative
approaches within AM is a major shortcoming of the book.
ANALYTICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE MARXISM
There is no set of substantive propositions that define AM as a school. There
are, however, some common traits that characterise a style of theorising: a core
tenet of AM, and its main departure from classical Marxism, is the denial of a
specific Marxist methodology, dialectical or otherwise (pp.130-32). More
precisely, Wright (1989, 38-9) proposes the following definition.
DEFINITION 1. AM is defined by the analysis of Marxist issues and:
C1. “A commitment to conventional scientific norms.”
6C2. “An emphasis on the importance of systematic conceptualisation.”
C3. “A concern with a relatively fine-grained specification of the steps in the
theoretical arguments linking concepts.”
C4. “The importance accorded to the intentional action of individuals.”
These four commitments and the rejection of a specific Marxist methodology
are neither trivial nor uncontroversial. Definition 1 is sufficiently general,
however, to allow for a wide range of methodological and substantive positions.
In fact, in order to find the minimum common denominator of AM, it does not
include the most contentious axioms endorsed by some of its most prominent
practitioners, in particular Jon Elster, Adam Przeworski, and John Roemer.
Rational Choice Marxism (hereafter, RCM) can be defined as follows.
DEFINITION 2. RCM is defined by C2, C3, and a commitment to:
C1’. The use of “state of the arts methods of analytical philosophy and ‘positivist’
social science” (Roemer 1986C, 3-4).
C4’. Methodological individualism (hereafter, MI) and rational choice theory.
Definition 2 does not apply to all analytical Marxists. For example, Cohen’s
reconstruction of HM relies on functional explanations, and Wright (1989)
endorses a realist view of science and rejects MI. 
The distinction between AM and RCM may help to resolve the tension
arising from Levine’s simultaneous emphasis on timeless, rational arguments and
on extra-theoretical factors in the explanation of the demise of AM. In fact,
Levine implicitly adopts Definition 1 (pp.130-32), but the only rational arguments
discussed relate to C1’ and C4’ (pp.141-44, 169-70). He argues that C4’ and
mainstream economic models are inconsistent with Marxist valuational
7commitments, because the latter are not amenable to formal modelling, imply
noncapitalist institutional arrangements, and are at odds with individualistic
approaches. Mainstream economic tools naturally lead to a liberal normative
outlook and a focus on distributive justice, rather than self-realisation, autonomy,
or fraternity. Thus Levine can be interpreted as suggesting that internal theoretical
developments have been important for the demise of RCM, whereas extra-
theoretical factors (largely unexplained in the book) have played a more relevant
role in the evolution of AM. This suggestion may be somewhat schematic but it
seems reasonable, given the wider range of methodological and substantive
positions consistent with Definition 1.
It can be objected that Levine’s analysis does not convincingly explain why
C1’ and C4’ are problematic from a Marxist perspective: it may clarify why RCM
gave up some communist ideals, but it has no bearing, for instance, on HM and
the theory of the state. Besides, normative issues are in a relevant sense not central
to Marxist theory, as argued by Levine himself (for instance, at pp.20, 137).
Normative issues aside, though, C1’ and C4’ do have relevant implications for
social theory. They incorporate strong assumptions that are not neutral with
respect to the orientation of research efforts and to the substantive results
obtained. Methodologically, by Definition 2 the only parts of Marx’s theory that
“make sense” are those that can be analysed within a MI perspective, or, more
narrowly, with “rational choice models: general equilibrium theory, game theory
and the arsenal of modelling techniques developed by neoclassical economics”
(Roemer 1986B, 192). From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that although
8Marx was “committed to [MI], at least intermittently” (Elster 1985, 7), he appears
methodologically inconsistent in that he does not support C1’ and C4’.
As for substantive Marxian propositions, RCM typically reaches two kinds
of conclusions. Some are considered either wrong or impossible to conceptualise
consistently with C1’ and C4’, and thus are discarded. Roemer (1986A) disposes
of much of traditional Marxist economic theory. After a long journey through
Marx’s writings, Elster (1986B, 60) concludes that “Today Marxian economics is
… intellectually dead”; together with scientific socialism, dialectical materialism,
and the theory of productive forces and relations of production (Elster 1986B,
186ff). Other concepts and propositions can be analysed according to C1’ and
C4’. Yet “if one accepts the methodological validity of individualistic postulates,
most if not all traditional concerns of Marxist theory must be radically
reformulated. Whether … the ensuing theory will be in any distinct sense
‘Marxist’, I do not know” (Przeworski 1985B, 400). For instance, Elster (1985)
and Przeworski (1985A) analyse some features of the symbiotic interaction
between classes in a game-theoretic framework, but at the cost of a substantive
shift in meaning and political implications. Roemer (1982) provides
microfoundations to the Marxian concepts of exploitation and class thanks to – or,
possibly, at the cost of – an almost exclusive focus on asset inequalities. 
Levine does not provide a critical analysis of RCM results in explanatory
social theory and it is unclear whether this part of the legacy of AM is deemed
relevant for the future of Marxism. This is unsatisfactory and it undermines his
main arguments. First, some results cast doubts on Levine’s reconstruction of the
core of Marxism. For instance, Elster (1985) and Przeworski (1985A) challenge
9the Marxist theory of the state. Furthermore, according to Levine, the latter is built
on the idea that “[a]mong the classes whose interests stand opposed, … [s]ome
(usually one) are in a position to take unfair advantage; to exploit, the others”
(p.156). This seems inconsistent with Roemer’s claim that Marxian exploitation
theory has no positive or normative relevance and it “merges now with a much
broader class of egalitarian theories of distributive justice” (Roemer 1986A, 88).
Second, and more important, according to Levine, RCM has shown that
Marx’s positions are remarkably translatable “into terms that bear scrutiny
according to the most demanding disciplinary standards in [mainstream]
philosophy or in appropriate social science” (p.132). Yet, after the translation,
“Marxism became a voice among the others in ongoing debates” (p.132). In many
areas of Marxist thought, “the operation succeeded (more or less), but the patient
died” (p.132). RCM results suggest that Marxism has no role to play in the social
sciences: its valuable insights have been incorporated into the mainstream, the rest
should be discarded. But then, given the absence of a proper critique, if not the
implicit acceptance of RCM results, Levine’s claim that Marxism may still be
relevant for the progress of social sciences is unwarranted. It may be true that,
thanks to their Hegelian roots, “Marx’s explanatory projects evince a concern with
the whole that is uncommon in mainstream economics and sociology. This focus
may yet prove crucial to gaining knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible”
(p.170). But this claim is left unexplained, and so are its methodological and
substantive implications. A generic ‘concern with the whole’ may entail the
rejection (or at least weakening) of C1’ and C4’, but it does not indicate a precise
direction for further research and it is a priori unclear that it can lead to reconsider
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RCM results. Equally vague are Levine’s other two “lines for further research”
(pp.169-71): the idea that a ‘concern with the whole’ may yield original insights
in normative theory, and the emphasis on the implications of HM for forms of
consciousness and cultural issues. So, the reconstruction of some core issues in
Marxist theory may be an important contribution of AM; but, what next?
WHITHER (ANALYTICAL) MARXISM?
An exhaustive analysis of the methodological and philosophical issues raised
by C1’ and C4’ is beyond the boundaries of this review. In what follows, a more
focused perspective is adopted and some key problems of C1’ and C4’ are shown
by analysing two specific issues that are arguably central in the social sciences,
namely the structural constraints to individual choice and the social formation of
individuals. As argued below, both issues play an important role in Marxist theory
and the introduction of structural constraints and endogenous preferences allows
for the revision of RCM results. This indicates a clear line for further research that
may depart from existing RCM models, but is consistent with Definition 1 and
with Levine’s reconstruction of the core of Marxism. 
The issue of structural constraints relates to the problem of generalising
individual-level predicates to group-level predicates, which may result in a fallacy
of composition. As acknowledged by RCM, fallacies of composition are central in
the social sciences as “agents tend to generalize locally valid views into invalid
global statements, because of a failure to perceive that causal relations that obtain
ceteris paribus may not hold unrestrictedly” (Elster 1985, 19), leading to social
contradictions. In this case, though, the group as a whole faces a constraint that no
individual member faces, which suggests at least that MI be refined, because the
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analysis of the whole cannot be strictly reduced to the analysis of its parts. Within
AM, this issue forcefully emerges in Cohen’s (1983) discussion of proletarian
unfreedom. Cohen argues that proletarians are not forced to remain in their class:
they are individually free to improve their social condition. To generalise such
freedom, however, would involve a fallacy of composition, because it is not
possible for all proletarians to exit their class within capitalist relations of
production. Therefore, knowledge of group-level properties and constraints “is
prior in the explanatory order to understanding the conditional and contingent
state of the individuals” (Lebowitz 1994, 167). Social structures have explanatory
autonomy in that agents’ powers depend at least in part on their position in social
relations and, in general, both individual and structural constraints shape agents’
choices. In their analyses of classes, Przeworski (1985A) and Roemer (1982,
1988) suggest that a purely individualistic approach is adequate, whereby “a
person acquires membership in a certain class by virtue of choosing the best
option available subject to the constraints she faces” (Roemer 1988, 9). This
conclusion seems unwarranted. Veneziani (2005) argues that Roemer’s results
depend on severe restrictions on agents’ choices, such as the impossibility of
saving, which guarantee the reproduction of the social structure by fiat. Therefore,
structural constraints are in effect built into individual constraints. More
importantly, in the light of Cohen’s (1983) analysis, the individualistic approach
arguably provides a one-sided account, which may explain why an individual
remains in a given class, but not the structure of social classes.
Next, MI requires individuals to be logically prior and their attributes not to
be socially determined, or else structural features would play a fundamental
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explanatory role, via their effect on preferences and beliefs. The causes of the
attitudes and beliefs that determine action should themselves be nothing but the
actions and properties of individuals. The very distinction between individual and
social predicates is problematic, however, because “the individual-level predicates
relied on by the individualist have built into them salient features of the relevant
social context” (Weldes 1989, 361). Many RCM assumptions, such as individual
optimisation or the existence of labour markets and enforceable property rights,
arguably presuppose certain social relations. Moreover, even within given social
relations, many individual attributes are socially determined.
RCM acknowledges the importance of the social formation of individuals.
Przeworski questions the view of “undifferentiated, unchanging, and unrelated
‘individuals’” (Przeworski 1985B, 381) typical of rational choice theory. The first
step of Elster’s three-tiered theory of social scientific explanations requires the
“causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and beliefs” (Elster 1985, 5).
According to Roemer (1986B, 201), crucial to Marxism, and to AM, is “a
commitment to the malleability of human preferences, to the social formation of
the individual”. There is no theory of preference formation in RCM, however.
Preferences are assumed to be exogenous for theoretical or technical convenience.
“[O]nce the issue of the formation of preferences has been settled, then the most
convincing and fundamental explanation of a social phenomenon is … one that
explains [it] as the result of individuals pursuing their interests … subject to the
constraints they face” (Roemer 1989, 378). The formation of preferences is treated
as secondary, at least methodologically. For instance, although endogenous
preferences seem crucial, to understand collective action, due to the importance of
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solidarity and class consciousness, Elster’s game-theoretic analysis abstracts from
this issue. “Game theory takes preferences as given, and has nothing to offer
concerning preference formation” (Elster 1982, 480, n.46). If preferences can be
taken as exogenously given, though, it is unclear in what sense the social
formation of individuals is deemed crucial. Conversely, if endogenous preferences
are central to Marxism, it seems odd to draw general conclusions on Marx’s
propositions based on models that take them as exogenously given. Besides,
Rational Choice Marxists usually do not discuss the adequacy of this assumption. 
In many parts of Marx’s theory, endogenous preferences and structural
constraints do seem of essential relevance. In the next paragraphs, two examples
are briefly discussed to illustrate this point. First, consider Cohen’s reconstruction
of HM, in which historical progress is ultimately driven by the development of
productive forces. This view relies on a notion of transhistorical “rational adaptive
practices” of human beings, who face conditions of relative scarcity and “possess
intelligence of a kind and degree which enables them to improve their situations”
(Cohen 1978, 152). Scarcity and rationality lead to a tendency for productive
forces to develop and, eventually, to the transition from one mode of production
to the other. This interpretation has been criticised due to its technological
determinism and to a rather reductive view of human agency. It is thanks to the
introduction of structural constraints and endogenous preferences that Levine
develops a less determinist interpretation of HM, in which class struggle and
human agency play a more relevant role. Because “the content of both rational
action and scarcity … are not given for all the time, but are instead endogenous to
the social system; … determined by the relations of production themselves”
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(Levine and Wright 1980, 62), technological determinism seems inadequate to
explain historical progress. Only under specific structural conditions is the interest
in material advantage tied to an interest in productivity-enhancing investment.
Indeed, Brenner (1986) argues that Cohen’s interpretation cannot explain the
transition from feudalism to capitalism because pre-capitalist social formations
lacked such conditions and rent extraction was the dominant activity.
Next, consider Przeworski’s (1985A) critique of the Marxist theory of class
struggle. According to him, if socialist parties enter the electoral game, neither
socialist governments nor the working class will seriously challenge capitalist
rule. In fact, faced with any serious attempt to redistribute resources, capitalists
would cease to invest, leading to economic crisis and a subsequent decrease in
workers’ welfare, based on a profit squeeze mechanism whereby “if profits are not
sufficient then eventually wages or employment must fall” (Przeworski 1985A,
43). This argument is not entirely convincing. If Pe is some measure of
“sufficient” profits for capitalists, the profit-squeeze mechanism is consistent with
a wide range of values of Pe. Indeed, Mohun and Veneziani (2006) argue that a
short-run profit-squeeze cycle can be detected in the post-war US data, but the
cycle itself shifts widely over time, which suggests a change in Pe. But then the
theoretically and empirically interesting issue is arguably not the profit squeeze
mechanism, but the determination of Pe as the product of social, political, and
economic conditions. Thus, the extent to which we can redistribute the results of
market activity “without defeating our aim … varies inversely with the extent to
which self-interest has been allowed to triumph in private and public
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consciousness” (Cohen 1994, 10). Without an analysis of Pe, Przeworski’s
argument may be formally correct, but its explanatory power seems limited. 
In general, that “individual identities and thus preferences are continually
molded by society” (Przeworski 1985B, 384) is a key issue in the analysis of
political processes. Individualistic views of history cannot properly “explain how
actions of individuals produce new conditions … Today, the apparatus of game
theory can at best elucidate isolated, singular events that occur under given
conditions. It has nothing to say about history” (Przeworski 1985B, 401).
Similarly, it is unclear whether standard rational choice theory can provide a fully
satisfactory explanation of major political processes.
Although this discussion is far from exhaustive, these examples should
suggest that the analysis of endogenous preferences and structural constraints is a
promising line for further research that may lead to reconsider RCM results. To
acknowledge the importance of these issues blurs the dichotomy between holism
and MI, and raises doubts on standard models of agency. Although this research
project is likely to depart from existing RCM models, it does not entail the
rejection of formal models, or even neoclassical tools, let alone the repudiation of
micro-analysis. The introduction of structural constraints and endogenous
preferences is consistent with Definition 1 and with Levine’s central contention
concerning the relevance of AM for the future of Marxism, and it may provide the
first outline of a research program in explanatory social theory that builds on, and
is complementary to, the rational core of Marxism identified by Levine. 
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